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I. Introduction
Corporate law as part of commercial law denotes a part of private law close-
ly interconnected with regulation, i.e., administrative law and, in case of wrong-
doing, criminal sanctions. The main actors in today’s economy are incorporated 
businesses. Despite the ubiquitous registration requirement, corporations are a 
product of private action and private law. But “the corporation”, in the legal sense 
of a stand-alone entity as taught in law school classes, hardly exists. Even small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs), when incorporated, use structures that often 
consist of more than one legal person. Corporations usually come in groups; 
especially businesses with cross-border activities use local subsidiaries and not 
only branches. Moreover, “the corporation” as a legal entity is not  necessarily 
identical to the business undertaken, e.g., in case of holding companies.
The law treats this normal phenomenon sometimes as an exception, some-
times as a specific application of general law, sometimes not at all, depending 
on the field of law and the jurisdiction. Changes in law and jurisprudence oscil-
late between attempts to formulate a more or less comprehensive group law, to 
specify group-related issues of general corporate law, or to lump the companies 
in a group rather indiscriminately together and treat them as one single entity.1 
This heterogeneous treatment of a quite usual fact creates confusing overlaps 
and sometimes even contradictions. So what is group law all about, and what 
are the commonalities and differences seen in comparison with diverse fields of 
law and diverse jurisdictions?
II. Group Law as Corporate Law
First and foremost, group law is viewed as a subsection of corporate law. 
Definitions of what constitutes a “group” vary considerably but typically we find 
a “parent”2 company and one or more “controlled” companies, control based 
on holding more than 50% of the shares or other relations that ensure influ-
ence at the corporate level. Other relations (block-holdings, contracts, economic 
 dependency) may be factored in; the current discussion about responsibility of 
large businesses for their chain of supply may further blur the lines. 
1 Public international law, social theory and political science predominantly deal with “transnational 
corporations” (TNCs) or “multinational enterprises” (MNEs) as a single actor; e.g., Amstutz (2015), p. 191; 
RAtneR (2001-1002), p. 452; teubneR (2011), passim. 
2 In many countries the hierarchy is expressed in a matriarchal way: “société mère” in France, “Mutter-
gesellschaft” in Germany, “sociedade-matriz” in Portugal, “sociedad matriz” in Spain.
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Corporate law usually shapes the relations between parent and subsidiary 
and the protection of minority shareholders and creditors of controlled compa-
nies. Additionally, duties of care and loyalty in managing a controlled company 
raise the question of a “group interest”. Both perspectives, the protective and 
the organizational, merge in the search for “group governance”.3 Despite many 
similarities, the area of corporate group law is far from settled. Time and again, 
legislation, academic discussions and recommendations of best practice deal 
with group issues in a more or less comprehensive way. 
Even if not self-evident, accounting law should be considered part of corpo-
rate law. At least corporations using the capital market have to present audited 
group accounts; the respective EU legislation is based on Art. 50 TFEU; whether 
Member States implemented the Directive 2014/56/EU in a commercial code, 
company law, or in a separate statute makes no difference as to the qualifica-
tion.4 As to listed companies, capital market law also contains a considerable 
amount of corporate law cloaked in prerequisites for getting and staying listed. 
Broad overviews over typical problems arising from the affiliation of compa-
nies and strategies to deal with such problems can be found in the Proposal for 
Reforming Group Law in the European Union by ECLE5 and other publications.6 
The following summary, therefore, limits itself to only a few points relevant to the 
broader topic.
1. EU Law
Secondary EU law has no comprehensive ruling for corporate groups.7 Ear-
ly attempts, dating back to the early 1970s, failed for various reasons, one of 
them being too close to the unfamiliar German model widely held in contempt.8 
Yet, specific areas of corporate law considered important for the freedom of 
establishment and free movement of capital have been taken up in Directives 
and Regulations, and some of these areas cover characteristic group problems. 
3 Overview at szAbó/søRensen (2018).
4 Cf. CJEU 10.12.2015 C-594/14 Kornhaas, attributing laws to a certain field not by formal integration 
into a statute but by essence.
5 euRopeAn CompAny LAw expeRts (2016).
6 E.g., Hopt (2015); tRögeR (2015).
7 Cf. CJEU 20.6.2013 – C-186/12 – Impacto-Azul, § 35 noting the fact that rules concerning corporate 
groups are not harmonized at European Union level.
8 tRögeR (2015), at 2.2.1.1.
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The most topical area has been accounting and auditing, areas called “the 
centrepiece of European company law”.9 EU-law addresses these matters in 
Directives and, more recently, a Regulation pertaining to public interest entities. 
In 1983, the 7th Directive made consolidated group accounts and the statutory 
audit of such accounts mandatory; it has now been merged into the consoli-
dated and amended Directive 2013/34/EU. Art. 22 of that Directive defines the 
group for the purpose of consolidated financial statements but serves also as a 
reference point for other rules. Art. 24 Sec. 7 prescribes a fiction: “Consolidated 
financial statements shall show the assets, liabilities, financial positions, profits 
or losses of the undertakings included in a consolidation as if they were a single 
undertaking,” which, legally and in reality, they are not. This “enterprise approach”10 
is well established for information purposes, particularly for the capital market; 
consolidated accounts do not serve distribution purposes. The inclusion of a 
company in a consolidated financial statement does not release the individual 
company from preparing its own balance sheets.
Current shifts from financial accounting towards management accounting,11 
revealed in an ever-expanding management report, make adjustments that are 
relatively easy in figures much more difficult. Even under the entity approach, 
minority holdings are separately disclosed as non-controlling interests. Non- 
-financial and diversity information12 leaves little room for distinctions between 
wholly-owned subsidiaries, rather independent majority-owned, and other more 
or less micromanaged group members. Different management styles cannot be 
“consolidated” like the representation of transactions.
The amended Directive on shareholders’ rights (SRD II)13 focuses inter alia 
on related party transactions as defined in International Accounting Standard 
No. 24.14 The standard covers, for disclosure purposes, an entity’s subsidiaries, 
associates, joint venture interests, key management and close family members 
of key management. The consolidation process in group financial statements 
eliminates intragroup transactions; they do not form part of the consolidated 
financial statements. Consequently, such related party transactions and out-
standing balances between group members are not disclosed under IAS 24. 
9 gRundmAnn (2012), p. 356.
10 I.e., the group is seen as one enterprise; the opposite is the entity approach that looks at the separate 
legal persons; cf. Dir. 2013/34/EU recital 31; in EU-parlance the term “undertaking” is common for “enter-
prise”, in American English “firm”.
11 windbiCHLeR (2012), p. 1395 et seq.; windbiCHLeR (forthcoming 2019) at III. 3. b). 
12 Dir. 2014/95/EU amending Dir. 2013/34/EU.
13 Dir. 2017/828/EU amending Dir. 2007/36/EC.
14 Made binding for listed companies by Reg. (EC) 1606/2002 and Reg. (EC) 1126/2008 with subse-
quent amendments. 
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Yet, the individual companies need to keep track in their records of transactions 
with subsidiaries, the parent company or associates of the parent company for 
their individual financial statements. In this respect, the standard has a group 
law dimension.
The combination of quite heterogeneous kinds of relations may be suitable 
for disclosure purposes. Yet, the transfer into organizational law requires mod-
ifications and is causing abundant controversies.15 Art. 9c of SRD II separates 
various scenarios and strategies, with a partial exception for transactions within 
certain group situations in sec. 6. (a). 
Other secondary EU law touches upon group problems in a similar piece-
meal way. The EU Commission addressed corporate groups more or less in 
passing, e.g., in its Action Plan 2012.16 Issues defined and strategies employed 
follow suggestions for core areas developed in many expert panels. 
2. Expert Initiatives
Several expert groups and private initiatives tackled the intricate phenome-
non of corporate groups. The project “Corporate Group Law for Europe”, first 
published in 1998,17 was a joint effort of European specialists in company law. In 
a sort of follow-up in 2015, a slightly different body presented a proposal aimed 
specifically at facilitating the management of cross-border groups.18 Other highly 
committed ventures are the reports of the Reflection Group on the Future of 
EU Company Law (2011),19 the Informal Company Law Expert Group,20 and 
Chapter 15 of the “European Model Companies Act” (EMCA) by a Scandina-
vian-influenced consortium.21 The latter is again an attempt to create a rather 
comprehensive group law whereas the other reports keep to the core area 
approach. 
15 Hopt (2015) at IV.; enRiques/tRögeR (2018). 
16 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Eco-
nomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Action Plan: European company law 
and corporate governance – a modern legal framework for more engaged shareholders and sustainable 
companies, COM (2012) 740 final. 
17 Forum Europaeum Konzernrecht (1998); Forum Europaeum Corporate Group Law (2000); for com-
ments, see windbiCHLeR (2000). 
18 Forum Europaeum on Corporate Groups (2015).
19 Reflection Group on the Future of EU Company Law (2011).
20 ICLEG (2016), ICLEG (2017).
21 EMCA (2017); for comments, see ConAC (2016).
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3. National Laws
The German stock corporation law of 1965 became famous as the first 
“comprehensive” regulation of group law – Konzernrecht. However, it turned out 
to be by no means comprehensive; it focused on protecting creditors and minor-
ity shareholders of subsidiaries in existing groups. The perspective of the parent 
company, its shareholders and creditors was added later, first in academic writing 
followed by case law and eventually, for listed companies, in take-over law. The 
law on close corporations (GmbH) refers only sporadically to group situations. 
A prominent feature of German group law is the agreement on domination and 
transfer of profit and loss that plays out not only on a contractual level but follows 
the regimen of a change of the articles of incorporation. Therefore, the law of 
incorporation applies and the choice of law under Rome I22 is not available. The 
rules protecting a controlled stock-corporation are also lex societatis and cannot 
be contracted away.23 Another much less controversial innovation of the 1965 law 
was the detailed specification of mandatory consolidated group accounts.
In 1986, after comparative groundwork and in the run-up to accession to 
the European Community, Portugal enacted a code for business associations 
(código das sociedades comerciais) that contains in its 6th division rules on 
combined corporations.24 It followed the draft proposal for a 9th Directive that, at 
that time, was being discussed as cutting-edge. The code provides for affiliation 
agreements (following to a certain extent the German model); their practical sig-
nificance, however, seems very limited.25
As part of their transformation from a socialist economy to market struc-
tures, Slovenia, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic26 introduced more or 
less eclectic legal transplants of group law. The new Italian codice civile from 
2001, which came into force in 2004, contains rules for the governance and 
co-ordination of corporate groups27 mainly modelled on concepts from banking 
regulation. Turkey reformed its commercial code in 2011 establishing provisions 
on controlled companies and their management.28
22 Art. 1 (2) (f) Reg. (EC) 593/2008.
23 LAngenbuCHeR (2016), presents a summary of the German system (without conflict of law implications); 
for conflict of law provisions concerning groups, see geRneR-beueRLe/muCCiAReLLi et al., pp. 150 et seq.
24 Antunes (2005), pp. 372 et seq.
25 gAuse (2002), pp. 88 et seq., 161; critical Antunes (2005), pp. 376 et seq.: “No wonder that this regu-
latory strategy has failed”.
26 HAveL (2015), pp. 32 et seq., with references to later reforms.
27 Chapter IX (Art 2497 – 2497-sexies) codice civile; CARieLLo (2006).
28 Tekinalp Turkish Concepts and Approaches in Corporate Group Law, Festschrift für Claus Wilhelm 
Canaris Bd II, 2007, 849.
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The overall impression might be that more and more countries feel the ne-
cessity to have a specific structure for business combinations in corporate law. 
As in the pioneering example of Germany, none of these statutes is truly com-
prehensive. Scattered rules for specific topics from contract law29 to labour rela-
tions30 come on top of or even interfere with corporate group law. 
Other countries do not even attempt to find a blanket formula for group 
governance, but have a wide range of group-related laws and jurisprudence. 
In France, for instance, labour law recognizes an “unité économique et sociale” 
rather independently from corporate law (see III.3. below);31 the commercial 
code calls for group-wide supervision of compliance with human rights in certain 
large businesses;32 criminal courts acknowledge the recognition of group goals 
against the interest of the controlled company as admissible under certain circum- 
stances.33 British textbooks treat group issues explicitly but not separately and 
rather in context with general topics like directors’ duties, proper purpose or 
success of the company for the benefit of its members.34 American textbooks 
deal mainly with (fiduciary) duties of controlling shareholders and with gaining 
or changing control of a corporation, less with internal governance of groups.35 
Seen from the perspective of available remedies, piercing the corporate veil is 
ever-present for the protection of creditors; the criteria which allow the disregard 
of legal personality, however, vary considerably.36 
29 E.g., § 449 sec. 3 of the German civil code (BGB): extended retention of title in contracts of purchase 
and sale based on all obligations to affiliated companies is not allowed.
30 E.g., § 40 Austrian ArbVG: group-wide representation of employees.
31 CoziAn/viAndieR/deboissy (2012), § 1589 et seq.; LeCAnnu/dondeRo Droit des sociétés, 6th ed. 2015, 
§ 1545.
32 Code de commerce L 225-102-4; restricting the reach of the law Conseil constitutionnel, 23.2.2017 
[http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-par-date/
decisions-depuis-1959/2017/2017-750-dc/decision-n-2017-750-dc-du-23-mars-2017.148843.html] 
(23.12.2018); bARsAn (2017), pp. 422 et seq.
33 In the famous Rozenblum criminal case, the court considered the pursuit of a group interest as de-
fense against otherwise unlawful waste of corporate assets; however, the judgment did not turn on these 
criteria in the absence of the least hint of such justification; Cass. crim., 4 February 1985 (Rozenblum) in: 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?idTexte=JURITEXT000007064646 (23.12.1018); CoziAn/ 
/viAndieR/deboissy (2012), § 1585-1588.
34 E.g., HAnnigAn (2016), § 3-60, 9-59, 10-16.
35 E.g., ALLen/KRAAKmAn (2016), chapter 11; Cox/HAzen (2003), pp. 589 et seq.; o’KeLLey/tHompson 
(1999), pp. 675 et seq., 807 et seq.; pALmiteR (2006), pp. 579 et seq.; ventoRuzzo/ConAC/goto/moCK/notARi/ 
/ReisbeRg (2015), pp. 471 et seq., 519 et seq.
36 ALLen/KRAAKmAn (2016), 4.3.3.2; HAnsmAnn/squiRe (2018), pp. 252, 269 et seq.; ventoRuzzo/ConAC/ 
/goto/moCK/notARi/ReisbeRg (2015), pp. 151 et seq.
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III. Treatment of Corporate Groups in Other Fields of Law
The corporate group as the normal form to do business is subject to many 
laws other than corporate law. Some of such laws may address the group as a 
unit; others refer solely to the individual legal entities. Somewhere in the middle 
we find rules and principles of attribution and imputation. Some examples shall 
illustrate this phenomenon.
1. European Anti-trust and Competition Law
In a well-established line of cases, the CJEU holds that the term “under- 
taking” in competition law designates an economic unit even if in law that eco-
nomic unit consists of several persons, natural or legal. Therefore, it is justified to 
treat a closely-knit group (e.g., with wholly-owned subsidiaries) as one undertak-
ing; agreements or concerted practices within that group, e.g., assigning prices 
and specific areas of distribution to subsidiaries, are not in restraint of competi-
tion. The subsidiaries do not determine their own course of action.37 Competition 
between subsidiaries would be a mere management decision of the parent. The 
designation of the economic unit defines the scope of application of the compe-
tition rules. As plausible as this may be, in the context of group law the crucial 
point is the definition of the group as an “economic unit” taking into account the 
various stages of integration and diversification among legally separate units.
The “economic unit” perspective looks different when applied to perpetrators 
of infringements of competition law. Price-fixing committed by a subsidiary is im-
puted to the parent and other subsidiaries; the members of the group are liable 
for fines jointly and severally.38 The legal problem of the enterprise methodology 
presents itself clearly in this context: The group is not a legal entity; in its role 
as addressee of (competition) law it is nevertheless not an adequate subject for 
sanctions. Fines need a legal subject that can be liable, otherwise enforcement 
is impossible. The CJEU resorts to the legal entities forming the group; the con-
sequences in corporate law of such joint and several liability are left to national 
law governing the internal workings of the group.39 And, as before, the criteria 
for the “economic unit” are controversial. The Court uses assumptions that are 
37 CJEU 24.10.1996 C-73/95 P – Viho, with further references. 
38 CJEU 10. 9. 2009 – C-97/08 § 54 – Akzo Nobel; CJEU 29.9.2011 – C-521/09 P – Elf Aquitaine; CJEU 
27.4.2017 − C-516/15 P – Heat stabilizers (Akzo Nobel); EGC 13.7.2011 – T-144/07 § 92 ff. – Thyssen 
Krupp elevators.
39 CJEU 10.4.2014 – C-231/11 § 59 et seq. – Siemens Österreich; CJEU 26.1.2017 − C-625/13 § 151 
– Villeroy & Boch.
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allegedly rebuttable, but such a rebuttal never occurred. That may have been a 
matter of fact; more likely the standards of proof40 are impossible to meet. One 
prominent author called the rebuttal requirements a “probatio diabolica”.41 
2. Sector Specific Regulation 
Prominently in the financial services area, prudential regulation covers cor-
porate groups. The Solvency II-Directive,42 e.g., points out in recital 3: “It is in the 
interests [sic] of the proper functioning of the internal market that coordinated 
rules be established relating to the supervision of insurance groups”. In the same 
vein, the CRD IV-Directive43 states in recital 47: “Supervision of institutions on 
a consolidated basis aims to protect the interests of depositors and investors 
of institutions and to ensure the stability of the financial system. In order to be 
effective, supervision on a consolidated basis should therefore be applied to all 
banking groups, including those the parent undertakings of which are not credit 
institutions or investment firms.” As comprehensive organizational rules are a vi-
tal part of prudential regulation, the internal structure of a group needs to ensure 
compliance with such rules. “Member States should be able to refuse or with-
draw a credit institution’s authorisation in the case of certain group structures 
considered inappropriate for carrying out banking activities, because such struc-
tures cannot be supervised effectively.”44 Whether national corporate law allows 
for the respective organizational structures is of no concern to sector-specific 
regulation. Even within Solvency II itself the friction between enterprise and entity 
approaches shows: Art. 73 (1) asks that “[i]nsurance undertakings shall not be 
authorised to pursue life and non-life insurance activities simultaneously”; and 
“[t]he separate management referred to in Article 73 shall be organised in such 
a way that the life insurance activity is distinct from non-life insurance activity” 
(Art. 74 (1)). The long-term business shall be separated from other risks. Here, 
asset partitioning and the respect for the legal entity hardly harmonize with con-
solidated organization.45 
40 Cf. CJEU 8.5.2013 – C-508/11 § 64 et seq. – Eni; CJEU 16.6.2016 – C-155/14 P – Evonik Degussa; 
EGC 13.7.2011 – T-144/07 § 122 ff. – Thyssen Krupp elevators.
41 FLeisCHeR (2017), p. 13.
42 Dir. 2009/138/EC.
43 Dir. 2013/36/EU.
44 Rec. 49 of Dir. 2013/36/EU.
45 HAusmAnn/beCHtoLd (2015), pp. 347 et seq.
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Art. 45 (1) of the Directive on the prevention of money laundering46 demands 
group-wide policies and procedures, including data protection policies and 
policies and procedures for sharing information within the group for AML/CFT 
(anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism) purposes; 
those policies and procedures shall be implemented effectively at the level of 
branches and majority-owned subsidiaries in Member States and third countries. 
Again, whether national corporate law allows the implementation of policies and 
procedures based on majority ownership does not seem to matter; which legal 
entity ultimately has to bear which costs is left open. 
3. Labour and Employment Law
In this area, we find a whole range of mixed enterprise and entity methods. 
Group-wide organizational elements are a widespread notion when it comes 
to employee information and representation. Just to give some examples re-
gardless of differences in detail: France knows the comité social et économique 
commun for the unité économique et sociale;47 Germany has the Konzernbe-
triebsrat48 and Austria the Konzernvertretung.49 In the last-mentioned two coun-
tries, employee representatives on the supervisory board of parent companies 
come from the whole group.50 Information and consultation of employees is 
facilitated by European Works Councils on the group level.51 The establishment 
of an SE involves the formation of a special negotiating body representative of 
the employees of all participating companies.52 
On the other hand, employment relations are usually local and firmly tied to 
employer and employee as parties to a contract. The employer is necessarily a 
legal unit; the group, lacking legal personality, is unfit for contractual relations. 
The transfer of an employee from one subsidiary to another means switching 
the employment relation to another employer. Contractual arrangements can 
change this basic pattern, e.g., provide for variable employment within a group 
or parts of a group, but this is the exception. Not the fact that there is a group 
46 Dir. 2015/849/EU; see also Art. 13 (1) b) of said Dir. in conjunction with Art. 7 (5) a) Reg. (EU) 2015/847 
on transfers of funds.
47 Art. L2313-8 French code de travail, ordonnance no 2017-1386 of 22.9.2017, in: https://www.legi-
france.gouv.fr/jo_pdf.do?id=JORFTEXT000035607348 (23.12.2018).
48 § 54 German BetrVG.
49 § 88a Austrian ArbVG.
50 § 5 German MitbestG, § 110 (6) Austrian ArbVG.
51 Art. 1 (5) Dir. 2009/38/EC superseding Dir. 94/45/EC.
52 Art. 3 (2) Dir. 2001/86/EC.
21VOLUME III \ n.º 2 \ maio 2019
The Many Facets of «Group Law» \ Christine Windbichler
justifies such flexibility but the terms of the agreement, unless there is cause for 
attribution or relevant statutory or case law provisions referring explicitly to a 
group situation.53 
Employment is embedded in local protective laws, collective representation 
and agreements. When a multinational enterprise wants to implement “world-
wide” standards for behaviour in the workplace, it has to comply with local laws. 
This was made evident in a case where Honeywell wanted to introduce its uni-
versal code of conduct into its three German subsidiaries. The works council 
of the German subgroup took exception to the top-down imposition as some 
provisions of the code of conduct were subject to shop-floor co-determination, 
and prevailed in court.54 The case did not go into the particulars of the code of 
conduct; these were subject to mandatory negotiation between the works coun-
cil and the German holding subsidiary. However, it may be an educated guess 
that mandatory whistleblowing in a prescribed procedure does not sit well with a 
works council in a country whose culture reflects the catastrophic experience of 
the Nazis and the Stasi enticing everybody to spy on everybody. There, whistle-
blowing is considered a voluntary act deserving protection.55 
The principle of territoriality applies not only in labour and employment rela-
tions but pervades many fields of law. It prevails over direction rights in corporate 
law and limits the “enterprise approach”.
III. Analysis
1. Characteristics of Corporate Groups
Corporate groups are normal. No one in his right mind would call them gen-
erally “good” or “bad”. Maybe some specific forms of groups are suspicious; 
so-called pyramids denote an intrinsic imbalance of equity at risk and governing 
53 Example: In France, a redundancy notice is allowed only after all possibilities for placement in an avai-
lable position with the employer or other enterprises of the group – as defined in the code de commerce 
– are exhausted, Art. L1233-4 French code de travail.
54 BAG (German federal labour and employment law court) 22.7.2008 – 1 ABR 40/07, Neue Zeitschrift 
für Arbeitsrecht, 2008, p. 1248; see also LAG (Landesarbeitsgericht) Düsseldorf 14.11.2005 – 10 TaBV 
46/05, Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP), 2006, pp. 436 et seq. (Wal-Mart).
55 Cf. German Corporate Governance Code 2018, No. 4.1.3: “…Employees shall be given the oppor-
tunity to report, in a protected manner, suspected breaches of the law within the company; third parties 
should also be given this opportunity.”, available at https://www.dcgk.de/en/code.html; unchanged in 
the draft amendment 2019 at A. 3., in: https://www.dcgk.de/en/consultations/current-consultations.html 
(23.12.2018).
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power.56 Also, certain opportunistic behaviour like “tunnelling”57 is objectionable. 
Such problems and imbalances need addressing but abuse does not dominate 
the nature of corporate groups in general. It all depends on context and purpose 
of rules applied.
For the single business corporation, despite all differences from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction, some commonalities have been identified. According to a prom-
inent publication one can call them the “anatomy” of corporations.58 Five basic 
characteristics are legal personality, limited liability, transferable shares, delegat-
ed management with a board structure, and investor ownership. For listed com-
panies, one may add mandatory and standardized financial statements, external 
audit and disclosure of such accounts.59 Yet, the corporate group seems to defy 
such commonalities. A first attempt to identify universal traits is the notion of the 
absence of legal personality and the basic legitimacy of the group.60 That leaves 
plenty of room for variation, be it in the direction of the closely-knit enterprise-like 
group or the very loosely organized financial conglomerate with almost no inter-
nal connections in day-to-day business.
2. Functions of Corporate Groups
Whereas legal problems of corporate groups are amply discussed, their 
practical business functions61 are seldom addressed. Scandals, fraud, and dys-
functionality get a lot of attention. But in reality, most groups seem to navigate 
the treacherous legal waters quite well – and go unnoticed.62 This does not mean 
that the current legal treatment of groups is flawless and needs no improve-
ments. Endemic sources of opportunism, contradictions of laws and other legal 
frictions cause avoidable transaction costs. There is no reasonable binary choice 
between a strict entity approach and an enterprise perception of the group as a 
unit. The challenge is rather under which circumstances the entity perspective 
prevails or a more consolidated view is vindicated.
56 E.g., moRCK/tiAn (2015). 
57 Misappropriation of value of a corporation by insiders, cf. enRiques/HeRtig/KAndA/pARgendLeR in Ana-
tomy (2017), p. 146.
58 KRAAKmAn/dAvies/HAnsmAnn/HeRtig/Hopt/KAndA/RoCK in: KRAAKmAn/dAvies et al. (2004), pp. 5 et seq.
59 windbiCHLeR (2012), pp. 1391 et seq. 
60 Hopt (2015), p. 9.
61 The term “function“ is used here as described by ARmouR/HAnsmAnn/KRAAKmAn/pARgendLeR in: KRAAKmAn/
ARmouR et al. (2017), pp. 3 et seq.
62 Cf. CHeFFins (1997), p. 26: “Like other areas of commercial endeavour, the law’s role in company’s 
affairs is often a marginal one”, p. 28: “… the law’s impact on company affairs is often insubstantial”.
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Whether a company merges with another or keeps an acquisition as a sub-
sidiary, opens a branch in another country, or forms a local corporation are busi-
ness decisions driven by various factors, last but not least tax purposes. The 
implementation of such decisions needs private law forms, mostly contracts 
or corporate patterns. The corporate group provides for organizational options 
which the stand-alone company does not offer. Doing business in the form of a 
group uses tools from the private law toolbox. None of these tools is intrinsically 
“good” or “bad”.
One basic function of the corporate group is the provision of a plurality of 
incorporation laws.63 A local subsidiary offers organizational opportunities differ-
ent from a branch and allows for closer adaptation to locally trusted structures. 
Since the group itself is not incorporated, it has no homogenous incorporation 
law.64 
The separate legal entities offer pre-determined breaking points. The term 
comes from engineering and means a notch or device that is weaker than the 
rest of a part; there, an element can break apart in an orderly and predictable way. 
The grooves in a bar of chocolate give a common example. When a conglom-
erate wants to divest activities that are too remote from its core business it can 
sell the stock in the respective company, even float the subsidiary in the capital 
market or place the equity in a run-off company. Such transactions are relatively 
uncomplicated compared to asset deals.65 Corporate spin-offs that first create a 
parent-subsidiary structure may precede such changes. In case of bankruptcy of 
a parent, healthy subsidiaries can survive separately. If an acquisition does not 
yield the expected synergies, as many acquisitions do, the buyer can market the 
acquired shares again. After a full-fledged merger the separate legal entity of the 
acquired business is lost and makes divesting much more complex. Stock deals 
leave contractual relations of the legal entity with third parties untouched whereas 
asset deals may provoke unwanted renegotiations. Moreover, acquisitions as well 
as spin-offs allow for a plurality of investors, e.g., retaining a significant block of 
shares. Asset deals, by comparison, are all-or-nothing decisions.
Ownership of 100% of another company’s shares is just one possibility of 
a parent-subsidiary relationship. It eliminates the minority-shareholder problem 
but also foregoes the governance aspects of a plurality of shareholders. EU 
law requires the availability of single-shareholder corporations and disclosure 
of sole ownership;66 the SUP (Societas Unius Personae) should diminish set-
up and operational costs for foreign subsidiaries, especially of small and medium 
63 HAnsmAnn/squiRe (2018), p. 266.
64 menjuCq (2016), § 25 et seq.
65 HAnsmAnn/squiRe (2018), pp. 266 et seq. 
66 Dir. 2009/102/EC.
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enterprises; 67 the attempt to introduce this form, however, failed last but not 
least because of unresolved general corporate law problems outside of the 
group context. National laws vary on special laws concerning single-shareholder 
companies. The model act EMCA introduces an assumption that the company 
follows the parent’s instructions, with the consequence of the parent’s liability for 
the subsidiary’s debt under certain conditions.68 The FECG suggests a simplified 
type of subsidiary: the Service Company which is wholly-owned, not larger than 
mid-size according to EU definitions, and serves exclusively the interests of the 
parent or other companies of the group.69 
Such attempts to deal with the phenomenon of the wholly-owned subsidiary 
show the common recognition of the significance of the separate legal enti-
ty despite centralization of certain matters within the group. The function of a 
pre-determined breaking point may not be prevalent but is still available. More 
important is the fact that separate legal entities allow for co-ordination by con-
tract. Within a legal entity, exchanges are matters of cost centres and manage-
ment tools but, for the lack of a counterpart, not legally relevant matters. Without 
a plurality of actors, the topic of related party transactions would not exist. The 
group combines contractual relationships between the companies forming the 
group and the organizational co-ordination by corporate means, like voting pow-
er and organ competencies.
IV. Conclusion
The corporate group succeeded as the pervasive form of business associa-
tion; it is a product of private law, private autonomy, and resourcefulness. Regu-
lation should not undermine its success but channel undesired side effects and 
ensure effective compliance with sector specific law. Scandal-driven legislation 
often reflects political power struggles and lacks consistency.70 Sector-specific 
regulation may reduce the range of appropriate structures for carrying out cer-
tain business activities as pointed out above for financial services; the assump-
tion of rather strict hierarchies may become a self-fulfilling prophecy.71 A general 
67 COM(2014) 212 final, 9.4.2014; extensive discussion of the proposal in issue no. 2 of vol. 12 Euro-
pean Company and Financial Law Review (2015).
68 EMCA (2017), Sec. 15.09 (4) 1: “In the absence of a contrary disclosure, a wholly-owned subsidiary 
is presumed to be subject to instructions of its parent company and does not need to make a disclosure in 
the Commercial registry, except to disclose that it is wholly-owned.” 
69 FoRum euRopAeum on CoRpoRAte gRoups (2015), par. 10.
70 spindLeR (2005), pp. 105 et seq.
71 HAusmAnn/beCHtoLd (2015), pp. 355 et seq.
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call for group-wide compliance with whichever law or standard, organized by 
a parent company, lends itself to concentration and ever larger and tightly knit 
units. The probatio diabolica in competition law, the burden of negative proof 
(no guidance or influence) combined with group-wide compliance expectations, 
may have a similar effect.
Corporate group law identifies typical conflicts of interest and develops strat-
egies of governance. Here, too, cookie-cutter-like solutions, like automatic liabil-
ity of a parent for debt of a subsidiary or automatic direction rights72, run the risk 
of undermining the functionality of asset partitioning and legal personality. The 
comparison of subsidiaries with stand-alone corporations, as required in some 
related-party transaction laws and standards, has its limits, too. Some controlled 
companies owe their existence to the life-saving interception in a crisis. The 
escape to the recognition of a “group interest” opens a rather bottomless pit in 
view of the difficulty to define the “interest of the corporation”. Technically, the 
so-called Rozenblum concept73 is an elaboration of the business judgment rule. 
The task of legal scholarship lies in recognizing, harmonizing, and develop-
ing the various strategies informed by practical experience but not confined to 
the most recent scandal or an isolated focal point. The major challenge is not the 
creation of a new legal instrument called “corporate group”, but the adequate 
adjustment to the characteristics of the group at hand. Corporate groups are a 
multifaceted phenomenon;74 they will remain a moving target.
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